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Abstract The class of totally balanced games is a class of transferable-utility
coalitional games providing important models of cooperative behavior used in
mathematical economics. They coincide with market games of Shapley and
Shubik and every totally balanced game is also representable as the minimum
of a finite set of additive games. In this paper we characterize the polyhedral
cone of totally balanced games by describing its facets. Our main result is that
there is a correspondence between facet-defining inequalities for the cone and
the class of special balanced systems of coalitions, the so-called irreducible min-
balanced systems. Our method is based on refining the notion of balancedness
introduced by Shapley. We also formulate a conjecture about what are the
facets of the cone of exact games, which addresses an open problem appearing
in the literature.
Keywords Coalitional game · Totally balanced game · Balanced system ·
Polyhedral cone
1 Introduction
Totally balanced games were introduced by Shapley and Shubik in their study
of market games with transferable utility [17], which arise naturally in the
area of mathematical economics. Loosely speaking, market games are coali-
tional games derived from a market in which the production functions are
concave and continuous. A transferable-utility coalitional game is termed to-
tally balanced whenever each of its subgames is balanced. The two families of
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coalitional games coincide, that is, a coalitional game is totally balanced if and
only if it is a market game; see [17]. Kalai and Zemel [8] showed that every
totally balanced game is the minimum of a finite set of additive (inessential)
coalitional games. This characterization enabled them to show that the class of
totally balanced games is the same as the class of certain games derived from
graphs, the so-called flow games; cf. [8, Theorems 1–2]. Another characteriza-
tion was given by Cso´ka et al. [5]: totally balanced games are precisely risk
allocation games. Despite their relative simplicity, the class of totally balanced
games thus offers a rich source of examples of game-theoretic and economi-
cal phenomena, since it also includes minimum cost spanning tree games [2],
assignment games [18], linear production games [12], and games arising from
controlled programming problems [7].
The notion of a balanced collection of coalitions, which was introduced by
Shapley [16], is a key ingredience in dealing with totally balanced games and
their subfamilies. In the literature there exist several attempts at modifying
that concept; these appear to be important in the study of special classes of
games and their properties. Specifically, Cso´ka et al. [6] use exact balancedness
and overbalancedness to provide new characterizations of the class of exact
games. Lohmann et al. [9] then employed minimal exact balanced collections
and showed that only these collections are needed to guarantee exactness of a
game.
In this paper we characterize the set of totally balanced games as a convex
polyhedral cone. This can be done in several ways. Our main result, Theorem
5.1, offers a complete characterization of facet-defining inequalities of the cone;
each of these is associated with a special min-balanced system. The paper is
structured as follows. We introduce our notation and terminology in Section 2,
where we also review basic facts about minimal balanced systems of coalitions
in the style of Shapley [16]. In Section 3 we explain our framework for analyz-
ing cones of set functions and introduce our machinery for manipulating valid
linear inequalities. This approach makes it possible to show that important
cones of set functions are closed under the operation of reflection (Defini-
tion 3.1), which result even cannot be formulated with the usual definition
of a coalitional game as a set function vanishing at the empty set. Moreover,
facet-defining inequalities are often coupled into pairs of certain conjugate in-
equalities (Lemma 3.4). For the purposes of this paper it is useful to work
with linear inequalities in a special form, which is derived from min-balanced
systems and normalized in a particular way; this procedure is described in Sec-
tion 3.3. The crucial notion, which is necessary for the formulation of our main
theorem, is the concept of an irreducible min-balanced system discussed in Sec-
tion 4. Every other min-balanced system (= a reducible one) is redundant for
the description of totally balanced cone (Corollary 4.1). Section 5 contains
the main result (Theorem 5.1) saying that facets of the totally balanced cone
correspond to irreducible min-balanced set systems, together with a series of
lemmas leading to its proof. Interestingly enough, one of the by-products of
our research is a contribution to the question studied by Lohmann et al. in [9],
namely what are the facet-defining inequalities for the cone of exact games. We
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formulate a conjecture about the form of those facet-defining inequalities in
Section 6. Appendix contains a list of min-balanced systems of sets associated
with facet-defining inequalities for small cardinalities of the player set.
2 Basic notions and results
Throughout the paper we assume that the reader is familiar with basic con-
cepts and facts from polyhedral geometry; see [15,1], for example.
We are going to use standard notions and results from cooperative game
theory; see [13]. For simplicity, we assume that a finite player set N contains
n ≥ 2 players which are denoted by the first n letters of English alphabet.
Thus, for example, we write N = {a, b, c, d} in case of 4 players. Subsets of N
are called coalitions.
Any n-dimensional real vector [xi]i∈N is called a payoff allocation and by
RN we denote the collection of all such vectors. Given A ⊆ N , the symbol
χA ∈ R
N is the incidence vector of A defined by
(χA)i :=
{
1 for i ∈ A,
0 for i ∈ N \A.
The zero vector in RN will be denoted by 0.
Given a non-empty coalition A ⊆ N , the symbol P(A) will denote the col-
lection of all its subsets. The symbol RP(A) will be used to denote the collection
of real-valued set functions on subsets of A, that is, mappings m : P(A)→ R.
Given m ∈ RP(N) and ∅ 6= A ⊆ N , the restriction of m to P(A) will be
denoted by mA; formally, mA ∈ RP(A) is defined by mA(S) := m(S) for any
S ⊆ A.
The zero vector in RP(N) will be denoted by 0 and the scalar product of two
elements θ and m in the linear space RP(N) by 〈θ,m〉 :=
∑
S⊆N θ(S) ·m(S) .
Given A ⊆ N , the symbol δA will denote its set indicator in RP(N) and υ↑A ∈
RP(N) the indicator of its supersets:
δA(S) :=
{
1 if S = A,
0 for other S ⊆ N,
υ↑A(S) :=
{
1 if A ⊆ S,
0 for other S ⊆ N.
The set functions υ↑A for A ⊆ N with |A| ≤ 1 then form a basis of the linear
subspace L(N) ⊆ RP(N) of modular set functions m satisfying
m(C ∪D) +m(C ∩D) = m(C) +m(D), for all C,D ⊆ N.
The linear space L(N) has the dimension 1 + |N |.
Given a set S ⊆ RP(N), its dual cone is
S∗ := {m ∈ RP(N) : 〈θ,m〉 ≥ 0 for any θ ∈ S }.
A well-known elementary fact is that C ⊆ RP(N) is a non-empty closed convex
cone iff C = C∗∗, which happens iff C = S∗ for some S ⊆ RP(N); see for
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example [20, Consequence 1]. Thus, if one shows, for a non-empty polyhedral
cone C ⊆ RP(N) and D ⊆ RP(N) that D = C∗ then this implies that C = D∗
and, moreover, that C and D are mutually dual polyhedral cones. Another
well-known fact in polyhedral geometry is that the face-lattices of dual cones
are anti-isomorphic; see [1, Theorem7.41]. In particular, if C is a pointed cone,
which means −C ∩ C = {0}, then the facets of D are in bijection with the
extreme rays of C.
A (transferable-utility coalitional ) game over (a set of players)N is modeled
by a real function m : P(N) → R such that m(∅) = 0. We will use G(N) to
denote the collection of all such functions; any m ∈ G(N) will briefly be called
a “game”. If ∅ 6= A ⊆ N then the restriction mA to P(A) is called a subgame
of the game m ∈ G(N).
The core C(m) of a game m ∈ G(N) is the set of all Pareto efficient and
coalitionally rational payoff allocations, that is, formally
C(m) := { [xi]i∈N ∈ R
N :
∑
i∈N
xi = m(N) &
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ m(S) for all S ⊆ N} .
We say that a game m ∈ G(N) is
– balanced if C(m) 6= ∅;
– totally balanced if every subgame of m is balanced;
– exact if, for each coalition S ⊆ N , there exists a payoff allocation [xi]i∈N ∈
C(m) in the core that is tight for S, which means that
∑
i∈S xi = m(S).
We introduce the following notation:
B(S) := {m ∈ G(S) : m is balanced}, for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N,
T (N) := {m ∈ G(N) : m is totally balanced},
E(N) := {m ∈ G(N) : m is exact}.
Recall from [8, Theorem1] thatm ∈ T (N) iff it has a finite min-representation,
which means there exists a nonempty finite X ⊆ RN such that
m(S) = min
x∈X
∑
i∈S
xi for any S ⊆ N.
It is well-known that m ∈ E(N) iff it has a min-representation ∅ 6= X ⊆ C(m);
see [21, Proposition 1], for example. Hence, we get the inclusions E(N) ⊆
T (N) ⊆ B(N) ⊆ RP(N).
Moreover, all these sets are polyhedral cones in the linear space RP(N).
Specifically, the fact that B(N) is determined by finitely many linear inequal-
ities is a consequence of classic results by Bondareva [3] and Shapley [16],
recalled in later Lemma 3.5. The cone T (N) is polyhedral since it follows
immediately from the definition that
T (N) =
⋂
∅6=S⊆N
{m ∈ G(N) : mS ∈ B(S) }.
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Finally, E(N) is a polyhedral cone by the results contained in [6] or [9]. Since all
the discussed cones are polyhedral, each of them is fully determined by finitely
many linear inequalities only. It turns out that the facet-defining inequalities
correspond to special set systems, which we define in the next section.
2.1 Min-balanced systems
Any subset B of P(N) is called a set system. The union of sets in B will be
denoted by
⋃
B and their intersection by
⋂
B. We will call
⋃
B the carrier
of B. Minimality of set systems is always understood in the sense of their
inclusion as subsets of P(N).
Definition 2.1 Let B ⊆ P(N) be a non-empty set system with a carrier
M ⊆ N . We say that B is min-balanced if it is a minimal set system in P(N)
satisfying the condition:
The vector χM belongs to the conic hull of {χS ∈ R
N : S ∈ B}. (†)
If B ⊆ P(N) is a min-balanced system whose carrier is M , then we briefly say
that B is min-balanced on M. A min-balanced system B with |B| ≥ 2 will be
named non-trivial.
Clearly, a permutation of players transforms a non-trivial min-balanced
system also to a non-trivial min-balanced system. A catalogue of permutational
types of non-trivial min-balanced system on N , where 2 ≤ |N | ≤ 4, can be
found in Appendix.
Lemma 2.1 A non-empty set system B ⊆ P(N) is min-balanced if and only
if the following two conditions hold:
(i) There exist strictly positive coefficients λS > 0 for S ∈ B such that
χ⋃B =
∑
S∈B
λS · χS .
(ii) The incidence vectors {χS ∈ RN : S ∈ B} are linearly independent.
Hence, a non-empty B ⊆ P(N) is min-balanced iff it is a minimal set system
satisfying (i).
The condition (i) is the balancedness condition from [16]. Therefore, we
also say that B is balanced on M whenever (i) holds with M =
⋃
B. Sim-
ilar terminology is often used in game-theoretical literature; see, for exam-
ple, an equivalent concept of S-balanced collection [19, Section 2-3]. The last
claim in Lemma 2.1 motivated our terminology, which follows the usual game-
theoretical terminology. The condition (ii) is equivalent to the minimality and
implies the uniqueness of the coefficients λS in (i).
6 Toma´sˇ Kroupa, Milan Studeny´
Proof LetM denote the carrier of B. To show the necessity of (i) write χ⋃B =
χM =
∑
S∈B λS · χS with λS ≥ 0 by (†). If λS vanishes for some S, then
take B′ = {T ∈ B : λT > 0} and get a contradictory conclusion that B′
is a strict subsystem of B satisfying (†). The necessity of (ii) can then be
shown by contradiction: otherwise a non-vanishing system of real coefficients
{γS : S ∈ B} exists such that
∑
S∈B γS · χS = 0 ∈ R
N . For any ε ≥ 0 put
λεS := λS+ε·γS and observe that χM =
∑
S∈B λ
ε
S ·χS . Since all λS ’s are strictly
positive by (i), there exists a maximal ε > 0 such that all λεS are non-negative.
Put B′ = {T ∈ B : λεT > 0} and derive the contradiction analogously.
Conversely, if both (i) and (ii) hold, then χM = χ⋃B =
∑
S∈B λS · χS
with λS > 0. Assume for a contradiction that C ⊂ B exists such that χM =∑
S∈C νS · χS with νS ≥ 0, S ∈ C. Put νS = 0 for S ∈ B \ C and note
0 =
∑
S∈B(λS − νS) · χS , which contradicts (ii).
The last claim in Lemma 2.1 is a direct consequence of the proven equiva-
lence. ⊓⊔
Note that the balancedness condition (i) in Lemma 2.1 cannot be weakened
to (†). Indeed, (†) with M =
⋃
B and (ii) do not imply (i) as the following
example shows. Put N = {a, b, c} and B = { {a}, {b}, {b, c} }. Then χ⋃B =
1 · χ{a} + 0 · χ{b} + 1 · χ{b,c}, but (i) is not true. We now collect basic facts
about non-trivial min-balanced systems.
Lemma 2.2 Let B ⊆ P(N) be a non-trivial min-balanced system. Then the
following conditions hold:
– ∅,
⋃
B 6∈ B and |
⋃
B| ≥ 2,
–
⋂
B = ∅,
– there are at most |
⋃
B| sets in B.
Proof Since B is non-trivial, it is necessarily non-empty, so Lemma 2.1 applies.
Then Lemma 2.1(ii) implies that ∅ /∈ B. As B contains at least two non-empty
sets, necessarily |
⋃
B| ≥ 2. Assume for contradiction that
⋃
B ∈ B. Then
the non-triviality assumption |B| ≥ 2 and (i) imply together that χ⋃B can be
expressed in two different ways as a linear combination of {χS ∈ RN : S ∈ B},
which contradicts (ii). Hence,
⋃
B 6∈ B.
By non-triviality we have
⋃
B \
⋂
B 6= ∅. Assume for contradiction that⋂
B 6= ∅. Consider i ∈
⋂
B, j ∈
⋃
B \
⋂
B and choose T ∈ B with j 6∈ T . Then
i ∈ T and one can write using the formula in Lemma 2.1(i),∑
S∈B
λS =
∑
S∈B:i∈S
λS = (χ⋃B)i = 1 = (χ
⋃
B)j =
∑
S∈B:j∈S
λS .
This implies
∑
S∈B:j 6∈S λS = 0, which gives a contradictory conclusion that
simultaneously λT > 0 and λT = 0. Hence, necessarily
⋂
B = ∅.
Consider k = |
⋃
B|. Since the linear space Rk is k-dimensional, there are
at most k linearly independent vectors in it. Thus, by Lemma 2.1(ii), B can
have at most k sets. ⊓⊔
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Every set-theoretic partition of a non-empty subset of N into non-empty
blocks is a min-balanced system. A more general example, which is not a
partition, is as follows.
Example 2.1 Let N := {a, b, c, d, e}. Put B := {{a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}, {b, c, d}}
and define
λS :=
{
1
3 for S ∈ {{a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}},
2
3 for S = {b, c, d}.
One can check using Lemma 2.1 that B is min-balanced and its carrier is
{a, b, c, d}.
3 Our framework for dealing with linear inequalities
The cones of games introduced in Section 2 are not full-dimensional in RP(N).
This implies that their facet-defining inequalities have several equivalent writ-
ings in this linear space. We are going to introduce useful conventions in order
to establish a (one-to-one) correspondence between (facet-defining) inequali-
ties and certain set systems.
3.1 Taking the empty set into consideration
Traditional game-theoretical literature deals with set functions m : P(N)→ R
satisfying m(∅) = 0, which typically leads to restricting considerations to the
linear space RP(N)\{∅}. This restriction, however, causes later formal compli-
cations and hides some important symmetries. To reveal those symmetries we
intentionally consider the entire space RP(N) and extend our cones of games
so that the resulting cones contain constant set functions.
Specifically, for everym ∈ RP(N), a shifted set function m˜ ∈ RP(N) defined
by
m˜(S) := m(S)−m(∅) for every S ⊆ N (1)
is a game over N and we define:
B(N) := {m ∈ RP(N) : m˜ ∈ B(N) },
T (N) := {m ∈ RP(N) : m˜ ∈ T (N) },
E(N) := {m ∈ RP(N) : m˜ ∈ E(N) }.
All these cones are full-dimensional in RP(N). A few basic observations about
these cones are below. Recall that by a tight valid inequality for a cone is
meant such a valid inequality for its vectors which holds with equality for
at least one vector in the cone. Note that all the considered cones have the
dimension at least 1. Therefore, their facets are non-empty, which implies that
every facet-defining inequality for them is a tight valid inequality.
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Lemma 3.1 The space L(N) of modular set functions is the (shared) linearity
space for cones B(N), T (N) and E(N). Analogously, the shared linearity space
for cones B(N), T (N) and E(N) is the space of modular games
L(N) := L(N) ∩ G(N).
Tight valid inequalities for each of these six cones have the following form in
RP(N): ∑
S⊆N
α(S) ·m(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=〈α,m〉
≥ 0 required for m ∈ RP(N) , (2)
where the coefficient vector α ∈ RP(N) satisfies
∑
S⊆N : i∈S α(S) = 0 for any
i ∈ N . Moreover, the coefficient vectors of tight valid inequalities for cones
B(N), T (N) and E(N) even satisfy∑
S⊆N
α(S) = 〈α, υ↑∅〉 = 0,
∑
S⊆N : i∈S
α(S) = 〈α, υ↑{i}〉 = 0 for any i ∈ N .
(3)
Proof The first observation is that, for every i ∈ N , one has υ↑{i},−υ↑{i} ∈
E(N), with singleton cores {χ{i}} and {−χ{i}}. Thus, υ
↑{i} ∈ −E(N) ∩ E(N)
for any i ∈ N , which implies L(N) ⊆ −E(N) ∩ E(N). Since constant set
functions ±υ↑∅ ∈ RP(N) belong to E(N) one analogously observes L(N) ⊆
−E(N) ∩ E(N).
The second observation is that the only r ∈ −B(N) ∩ B(N) satisfying
r(S) = 0 for S ⊆ N , |S| ≤ 1, is the zero game 0. To this end realize that every
balanced game m˜ ∈ B(N) satisfies m˜(N) ≥ m˜(T ) +
∑
i∈N\T m˜({i}) for any
∅ 6= T ⊂ N . Indeed, having x = [xi]i∈N in the core C(m˜), one can write
m˜(N) =
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈T
xi +
∑
i∈N\T
xi ≥ m˜(T ) +
∑
i∈N\T
xi
≥ m˜(T ) +
∑
i∈N\T
m˜({i}).
Thus, for any r in −B(N)∩B(N) with r(S) = 0 for S ⊆ N , |S| ≤ 1, both r and
−r can be taken in place of m˜, which results in r(N) = r(T )+
∑
i∈N\T r({i}) =
r(T ). Taking in place of T a singleton gives r(N) = 0; then taking general
∅ 6= T ⊂ N gives the rest.
This allows one to show −B(N) ∩ B(N) ⊆ L(N). Indeed, given m ∈
−B(N)∩B(N), put r := m−m(∅) ·υ↑∅+
∑
i∈N [m(∅)−m({i})] ·υ
↑{i}, realize
that r satisfies the above conditions and derive r = 0 to observe that m ∈
L(N). An analogous consideration with games leads to −B(N)∩B(N) ⊆ L(N).
One has E(N) ⊆ T (N) ⊆ B(N), the same holds for their multiples by
(−1), giving
L(N) ⊆ −E(N) ∩ E(N) ⊆ −T (N) ∩ T (N) ⊆ −B(N) ∩ B(N) ⊆ L(N) ;
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analogously E(N) ⊆ T (N) ⊆ B(N) shows that L(N) is the shared linear
space for the extended cones E(N), T (N) and B(N).
Let K be any of the above discussed cones in RP(N). Any linear inequality
for m ∈ RP(N) can be re-written in the form 〈α,m〉 ≥ k with α ∈ RP(N) and
k ∈ R; otherwise we multiply the inequality by (−1). Assuming it is a tight
valid inequality for K there exists m0 ∈ K satisfying 〈α,m0〉 = k. Because K
is a cone, for every ε > 0, one has ε ·m0 ∈ K and
ε · k = ε · 〈α,m0〉 = 〈α, ε ·m0〉 ≥ k ⇒ (ε− 1) · k ≥ 0 ,
which is possible for any ε > 0 only in case k = 0. Thus, the inequality has
the form (2).
Any inequality of the form (2) which is valid for vectors m ∈ K must
hold with equality for vectors in its linearity space. This implies the rest of
Lemma 3.1. ⊓⊔
A coefficient vector α ∈ RP(N) satisfying (3) will be called o-standardized,
where o stands for “orthogonal”. Indeed, (3) means that α is in the orthogonal
complement of L(N).
In the next lemma we show that the task to characterize facets of a cone of
games is equivalent to the task of describing facets of the associated extended
cone.
Lemma 3.2 The value of the coefficient α(∅) in (2) does not influence the
fact whether (2) is facet-defining for m ∈ T (N) or not. Specifically, if (2)
is facet-defining inequality for m ∈ T (N), then re-defining the value of the
coefficient α(∅) by
α(∅) := −
∑
∅6=S⊆N
α(S)
yields a facet-defining inequality for both m ∈ T (N) and m ∈ T (N). Con-
versely, every facet-defining inequality for T (N) is facet-defining for T (N).
The same relation holds for the pair of cones B(N) and B(N) and also for the
pair of cones E(N) and E(N).
Proof First, let us discuss the question of validity of (2) for games. Since every
m ∈ T (N) satisfies m(∅) = 0, we get
∑
S⊆N α(S) · m(S) =
∑
∅6=S⊆N α(S) ·
m(S). Thus, the value α(∅) is irrelevant for the validity (2) for m ∈ T (N)
and, also, it does not influence what is the face of T (N) specified by (2).
Therefore, the fact whether (2) is facet-defining for T (N) is not influenced
by the value of α(∅). Thus, it remains to show, for any α ∈ RP(N) satisfying
α(∅) = −
∑
∅6=S⊆N α(S), that (2) is facet-defining for T (N) iff it is facet-
defining for T (N).
First, observe for any α ∈ RP(N) satisfying α(∅) = −
∑
∅6=S⊆N α(S), that
(2) is valid for T (N) iff is valid for T (N). By Lemma 3.1, its validity either
for T (N) or for T (N) implies that α is o-standardized, that is, satisfies (3).
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We introduce
Tℓ(N) := {m ∈ T (N) : m({i}) = 0 for any i ∈ N }
= {m ∈ T (N) : m(S) = 0 for S ⊆ N , |S| ≤ 1 }
and realize that both T (N) = L(N) ⊕ Tℓ(N) and T (N) = L(N) ⊕ Tℓ(N),
where the symbol ⊕ denotes the direct sum of cones. The former fact implies,
for o-standardized α ∈ RP(N), that (2) is valid for T (N) iff it is valid for
m ∈ Tℓ(N); the latter fact implies the same for the cone T (N).
To see why the claim extends to facet-defining inequalities realize that the
set
AT = {α ∈ R
P(N) : α satisfies (3) and 〈α,m〉 ≥ 0 for m ∈ Tℓ(N) }
is a pointed convex cone. To this end realize that, for every A ⊆ N , |A| ≥ 2,
one has υ↑A ∈ E(N), with the core being the convex hull of {χ{i} : i ∈ A}.
Thus, by E(N) ⊆ T (N), one has υ↑A ∈ T (N), which gives υ↑A ∈ Tℓ(N).
Hence, any α ∈ AT satisfies 〈α, υ↑A〉 ≥ 0 for all A ⊆ N , |A| ≥ 2. In particular,
α ∈ −AT ∩AT must satisfy those inequalities with equality, which allows one
to deduce α = 0.
Owing to T (N) = L(N)⊕Tℓ(N), the set AT is the dual cone to T (N). This
implies that T (N) and AT are polyhedral cones which are dual each other (see
Section 2). Because AT is pointed, it implies that facets of T (N) correspond
to extreme rays of AT .
Analogously, T (N) = L(N) ⊕ Tℓ(N) allows one to observe that the dual
cone to T (N) has the form I(N)⊕ AT , where I(N) denotes one-dimensional
space of functions ι ∈ RP(N) such that ι(S) = 0 for ∅ 6= S ⊆ N . This simi-
larly implies that facets of T (N) correspond to co-atoms of the face-lattice of
I(N)⊕AT , and these have the form I(N)⊕R, where R is an extreme ray of
AT . Thus, in this context, facet-defining inequalities for either T (N) or T (N)
are precisely those which are given by α’s generating extreme rays of AT .
The arguments in the case of balanced cones and in the case of exact cones
are analogous, so, they are left to the reader. ⊓⊔
3.2 Reflection and conjugate inequalities
Two of the extended cones are closed under a special linear self-transformation
of RP(N).
Definition 3.1 By a reflection of m ∈ RP(N) we mean m∗ ∈ RP(N) given by
m∗(T ) := m(N \ T ) for any T ⊆ N .
Thus, reflection is nothing but inner composition with a “complement” map-
ping.
Lemma 3.3 The cones B(N) and E(N) are closed under reflection.
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Proof To show m ∈ B(N) ⇒ m∗ ∈ B(N) realize that one has −C(m˜) =
C(m˜∗), where m˜ is given by (1). To this end express the core C(m˜) in terms
of the upper bounds instead of the lower bounds:
C(m˜) = { [xi]i∈N : m˜(N) =
∑
i∈N
xi, m˜(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
xi, ∀S ⊆ N}
= { [xi]i∈N : m˜(N) =
∑
i∈N
xi, m˜(N)− m˜(N \ T ) ≥
∑
i∈T
xi, ∀T ⊆ N} .
This allows one to write
−C(m˜) = { [yi]i∈N : −m˜(N) =
∑
i∈N
yi, m˜(N \ T )− m˜(N) ≤
∑
i∈T
yi, ∀T ⊆ N}
= { [yi]i∈N : m˜∗(N) =
∑
i∈N
yi, m˜∗(T ) ≤
∑
i∈T
yi, ∀T ⊆ N}
= C(m˜∗) ,
because of the relation m˜∗(T )
(1)
= m∗(T ) − m∗(∅) = m(N \ T ) − m(N)
(1)
=
m˜(N \ T )− m˜(N) valid for any T ⊆ N .
In order to showm ∈ E(N)⇒ m∗ ∈ E(N), it is enough to realize addition-
ally that the inequality for S ⊆ N is tight at [xi]i∈N ∈ C(m˜) if and only if the
inequality for T = N \S is tight at [yi]i∈N = −[xi]i∈N ∈ −C(m˜) = C(m˜∗). ⊓⊔
Remark 3.1 There exists a widely used notion of duality in cooperative game
theory; see [13, Definition 6.6.3.]. The dual game of a gamem is then the game
m⋆ defined by
m⋆(S) := m(N)−m(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N .
Observe thatm⋆ = m(N)−m∗, wherem∗ is the reflection ofm from Definition
3.1. Similarly, it is possible to define the notion of an anti-dual game of m by
−m⋆. Using (1) observe that the anti-dual of m is precisely −m⋆ = m˜∗, which
is discussed in the above proof of Lemma 3.3. Then a natural question arises
how main solution concepts (e.g., the core) are related to duality or anti-
duality. In this context Lemma 3.3 says that a game is balanced/exact if and
only if its anti-dual is a balanced/exact game. The interested reader is invited
to consult the paper [11] for a detailed analysis of the relation of (anti-)duality
and solution concepts.
However, the cone T (N) is not closed under reflection as the following
example shows.
Example 3.1 Here is an example of m ∈ T (N) such that m∗ 6∈ T (N). Put
N = {a, b, c} and m(N) = 3 while m(S) = 2 for S ⊂ N with |S| = 2 and
m(R) = 0 for remaining R ⊂ N . It is a totally balanced game because it
has a min-representation by four vectors (1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 0), (2, 0, 2), (0, 2, 2).
Nevertheless, m˜∗(T ) = −3 for T ⊆ N , |T | ≥ 2, and m˜∗({i}) = −1 for i ∈ N .
It is a balanced game because of C(m˜∗) = {(−1,−1,−1)} but it is not totally
balanced because of C(m′) = ∅ for the restrictionm′ of m˜∗ to subsets of {a, b}.
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A concept related to the reflection is the following one.
Definition 3.2 Every inequality (2) is assigned a conjugate inequality of the
form ∑
T⊆N
α∗(T ) ·m(T )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=〈α∗,m〉
≥ 0 required for m ∈ RP(N) , (4)
where α∗ ∈ RP(N) is the reflection of the coefficient vector α ∈ RP(N) in (2).
Note in this context that α is o-standardized iff α∗ is o-standardized. An
important fact appears to be the formula
〈α∗,m〉 =
∑
T⊆N
α∗(T ) ·m(T )
T :=N\S
=
∑
S⊆N
α(S) ·m∗(S) = 〈α,m∗〉 (5)
valid for any pair α,m ∈ RP(N). It enables us to prove the following statement.
Lemma 3.4 An inequality (2) is facet-defining for E(N) iff its conjugate in-
equality (4) is facet-defining for E(N). The same relation holds for the cone
B(N).
Proof We first show that (2) is valid for E(N) iff (4) is valid for E(N). Because
of α∗∗ = α it is enough to verify that the validity of (2) implies the validity
of (4). Given m ∈ E(N), one has m∗ ∈ E(N) by Lemma 3.3 and 〈α∗,m〉
(5)
=
〈α,m∗〉
(2)
≥ 0.
One can perform an analogous consideration as in the proof of Lemma 3.2,
that is, to introduce Eℓ(N) := {m ∈ E(N) : m(S) = 0 for S ⊆ N , |S| ≤ 1 }
and put
AE := {α ∈ R
P(N) : α satisfied (3) and 〈α,m〉 ≥ 0 for m ∈ Eℓ(N) } .
The fact E(N) = L(N)⊕Eℓ(N) then implies that AE is the dual cone to E(N);
it means that α ∈ AE iff (2) holds for any m ∈ E(N). This implies the validity
of (4) for any m ∈ E(N), which means that AE is closed under reflection. In
particular, the reflection is a one-to-one linear mapping from RP(N) to RP(N)
which transforms AE onto itself. Such a linear mapping transforms faces of
AE to faces of AE of the same dimension.
One can show that AE is a pointed cone by the same arguments as in
the proof of Lemma 3.2. As the cones E(N) and AE are dual each other the
facets of E(N) correspond to the extreme rays of AE . Since the coefficients
of facet-defining inequalities for E(N) are just those which generate extreme
rays of AE and these are mapped by the reflection to (other) extreme rays of
AE , the conjugate inequalities to them must also be facet-defining.
The arguments for the balanced cone B(N) are analogous and are left to
the reader. ⊓⊔
In fact, the statement from Lemma 3.4 holds true for any full-dimensional
cone in RP(N) that is closed under reflection.
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3.3 How to assign an inequality to a min-balanced system
Facet-defining inequalities (2) for cones B(N) and T (N) appear to be deter-
mined uniquely (up to a positive multiple) by the induced set systems
Bα := {S ⊆ N : α(S) < 0 },
where α ∈ RP(N) is the respective coefficient vector. A converse relation is
established in this section. More specifically, given a non-trivial min-balanced
system B, by Lemma 2.1, there are unique coefficients λS , S ∈ B, with
χM =
∑
S∈B
λS · χS where M =
⋃
B and λS > 0 for S ∈ B.
In fact, one can even show that λS ∈ Q. Indeed, χM =
∑
S∈B λS · χS means
that the coefficient vector λ ∈ RB is a solution of a matrix equality λ ·C = χM
with a zero-one matrix C ∈ RB×N . Since unique solution exists, a regular
column B × T -submatrix of C, where T ⊆ N , |T | = |B|, exists such that
λ · CB×T = χM∩T . Since C has zero columns for i ∈ N \M one has T ⊆
M . Nevertheless, the inverse of this regular zero-one submatrix is a rational
matrix, which implies that the components of λ are in Q.
Thus, a unique integer k ≥ 1 exists such that all k ·λS ∈ Z with S ∈ B are
relatively prime. For any S ⊆ N , define
αB(S) :=

k if S = M =
⋃
B,
−k · λS if S ∈ B,
−k + k
∑
S∈B
λS = −αB(M)−
∑
S∈B
αB(S) if S = ∅,
0 otherwise.
(6)
This ensures the following equality:∑
S⊆N
αB(S) ·χS = αB(M) ·χM +
∑
S∈B
αB(S) ·χS +αB(∅) · χ∅︸︷︷︸
=0
= 0 ∈ RN . (7)
For any i ∈M one has∑
S⊆N : i∈S
αB(S) =
∑
S∈{M}∪B: i∈S
αB(S) = k − k ·
∑
S∈B: i∈S
λS =
= k · (1 −
∑
S∈B: i∈S
λS) = k · 0 = 0 .
Analogously, by the definition of M , one has
∑
S⊆N : i∈S αB(S) = 0 for any
i ∈ N \M ; thus, the vector αB ∈ ZP(N) is o-standardized. Choose i ∈M and
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consider T ∈ B such that i 6∈ T (note that B is non-trivial), which allows one
to write
αB(∅) = −αB(M)−
∑
S∈B
αB(S) = −k + k ·
∑
S∈B
λS = k · (
∑
S∈B
λS − 1)
= k · (
∑
S∈B: i∈S
λS − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ k · (
∑
S∈B: i6∈S
λS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥λT
> 0,
which implies αB(∅) ≥ 1. Thus, the corresponding inequality
〈αB,m〉 = αB(M)·m(M)+
∑
S∈B
αB(S)·m(S)+αB(∅)·m(∅) ≥ 0 for m ∈ RP(N)
(8)
of the form (2) is assigned the set system B = Bα with α = αB. This yields mu-
tually inverse transformation B ↔ αB = α between non-trivial min-balanced
systems and the coefficient vectors in the corresponding inequalities.
Definition 3.3 Given a non-trivial min-balanced system B ⊆ P(N), the
above coefficient vector in ZP(N) defined in (6) will be denoted by αB.
Example 3.2 Consider the min-balanced system B from Example 2.1 with the
player set N = {a, b, c, d, e}, that is, B = {{a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}, {b, c, d}}. The
carrier of B is M = {a, b, c, d} and the coefficient vector is
αB(S) :=

3 for S =M,
−1 for S ∈ {{a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}},
−2 for S = {b, c, d},
2 for S = ∅,
0 otherwise.
Then the inequality (8) takes the form
3·m({a, b, c, d})−m({a, b})−m({a, c})−m({a, d})−2·m({b, c, d})+2·m(∅)≥ 0 .
The next lemma follows from the results in [16, Theorem2]; one just applies
what is said in Section 3.1 about the correspondence between cones B(N) and
B(N).
Lemma 3.5 Assuming |N | ≥ 2 the facet-defining inequalities for B(N) are
just those which correspond to non-trivial min-balanced systems B on N . In
particular, given m ∈ RP(N),
m ∈ B(N) ⇔ 〈αB,m〉 ≥ 0 for any non-trivial min-balanced system B on N .
The following concept relates the above observation to concepts from Sec-
tion 3.2.
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Definition 3.4 Every min-balanced system B ⊆ P(N) is assigned its com-
plementary system
B∗ := {N \ S : S ∈ B} .
The fact that B(N) is closed under reflection then basically implies the
following.
Corollary 3.1 If B is a non-trivial min-balanced set system on N , then its
complementary system B∗ is also a non-trivial min-balanced system on N
inducing the conjugate inequality to the inequality (8) with M = N .
Proof If B is a min-balanced set system on N , then write using (7) and (6):
0 = k · χN −
∑
S∈B
k · λS · χS + (−k +
∑
S∈B
k · λS) · χ∅︸︷︷︸
=0
,
where the coefficients λS and the constant k are introduced in the beginning
of Section 3.3. We omit the zero term containing χ∅, multiply the equality by
(−1) and extend the right-hand side of it by ±k ·
∑
S∈B λS · χN to get
0 = (−k + k ·
∑
S∈B
λS) · χN −
∑
S∈B
k · λS · χN\S
= (−k +
∑
T∈B∗
k · λN\T ) · χN −
∑
T∈B∗
k · λN\T · χT + k · χ∅︸︷︷︸
=0
,
because the coefficient with χ∅ = 0 is immaterial. Thus, the coefficient vectors
assigned to B and B∗ by (6) are related by α∗B = αB∗ .
By Lemma 3.5, 〈αB,m〉 ≥ 0 is facet-defining inequality for m ∈ B(N).
By (the second claim of) Lemma 3.4 〈αB∗ ,m〉 = 〈α∗B,m〉 ≥ 0 is also facet-
defining inequality for m ∈ B(N). In particular, by Lemma 3.5, αB∗ must be
a positive multiple of αC for a non-trivial min-balanced system C on N . By
(6), this gives B∗ = C and B∗ is min-balanced. The fact that k · λS , S ∈ B,
are relatively prime integers then implies αB∗ = αC . Thus, 〈αC ,m〉 ≥ 0 is a
conjugate inequality to (8) (with M = N). ⊓⊔
Note that the above observation was already mentioned by Shapley [16] as
an empirical fact observed in case |N | ≤ 5.
4 Irreducible systems
We are in position to introduce the following concept, which is crucial for our
main result.
Definition 4.1 We say that a min-balanced system B ⊆ P(N) is reducible if
there exists A ⊂
⋃
B and B ∈ BA := {S ∈ B : S ⊂ A} such that
1. χA is in the conic hull of {χS : S ∈ BA} and
2. χ⋃B is in the conic hull of {χT : T ∈ {A} ∪ (B \ {B})}.
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A min-balanced system B ⊆ P(N) that is not reducible is called irreducible.
A reducible min-balanced system is necessarily non-trivial. Note that, with-
out loss of generality, one can require A =
⋃
BA 6∈ B in the definition of re-
ducibility, as proved below in Lemma 4.1. The meaning of the reducibility con-
dition is that the inequality corresponding to B is derivable from the inequali-
ties which correspond to other min-balanced systems B′ satisfying
⋃
B′ ⊆
⋃
B.
Clearly, the concept of irreducibility is invariant with respect to a permu-
tation of players. The types of non-trivial irreducible min-balanced system on
N for 2 ≤ |N | ≤ 4 can be found in Appendix.
Lemma 4.1 Let B be a min-balanced system. If A ⊂
⋃
B and B ∈ BA
exist such that both BA and {A} ∪ (B \ {B}) satisfy the conditions from
Definition 4.1, then |A| ≥ 2 and one has both
⋃
BA = A and A 6∈ B.
Moreover, there exist a min-balanced system C ⊆ BA on A with B ∈ C and
a min-balanced system D ⊆ {A} ∪ (B \ {B}) on
⋃
B with A ∈ D such that
the inequality (8) corresponding to B is a conic combination of inequalities
corresponding to C and D.
Proof Throughout the proof we will use M to denote the carrier of B, that
is, M :=
⋃
B. As B is non-trivial, one can apply Lemma 2.2. Hence, B ∈ B
implies B 6= ∅ and B ⊂ A gives |A| ≥ 2. The assumption that χA is in the
conic hull of {χS : S ∈ BA} means that there exist µS ≥ 0, S ∈ BA, with
χA =
∑
S∈BA
µS · χS , which implies A =
⋃
BA.
Analogously, the other assumption says that there exist βT ≥ 0, T ∈
{A} ∪ (B \ {B}), with χM =
∑
T∈{A}∪(B\{B}) βT · χT . Thus,
χM = βA · χA +
∑
T∈B\{A,B}
βT · χT = βA ·
∑
S∈BA
µS · χS +
∑
T∈B\{A,B}
βT · χT
=
∑
S∈BA
βA · µS · χS +
∑
T∈B\{A,B}
βT · χT
= βA · µB · χB +
∑
S∈BA\{B}
(βA · µS + βS) · χS +
∑
T∈B\({A}∪BA)
βT · χT .
On the other hand, since B is min-balanced, the uniquely determined coeffi-
cients λS , S ∈ B, in the decomposition
χM =
∑
S∈B
λS · χS (9)
must be all strictly positive by Lemma 2.1. The uniqueness of the coefficients
implies
λB = βA · µB (10)
λS = βA · µS + βS for S ∈ BA \ {B},
λT = βT for T ∈ B \ ({A} ∪ BA), and
λR = 0 for other R ⊆ N .
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This implies A 6∈ B as otherwise a contradictory conclusion λA > 0 and λA = 0
is derived from (9) and (10).
As λS > 0 for S ∈ B, the condition (10) gives λB > 0 ⇒ βA > 0 and
µB > 0. We put
C := {S ∈ BA : µS > 0} and D := {T ∈ {A} ∪ (B \ {B}) : βT > 0}
and obtain B ∈ C and A ∈ D. Since C ⊆ BA ⊆ B the linear indepen-
dence condition (ii) from Lemma 2.1 for C is evident and, therefore, again
by Lemma 2.1, C is min-balanced on A. To verify the linear independence
condition (ii) for {A} ∪ (B \ {B}) it is enough to show that χA is not in
the linear hull of {χS : S ∈ B \ {B} }. Thus, assume for contradiction that
χA =
∑
S∈B\{B} γS · χS with real γS , S ∈ B \ {B}, which yields
χM = βA · χA +
∑
T∈B\{B}
βT · χT = βA · (
∑
S∈B\{B}
γS · χS) +
∑
T∈B\{B}
βT · χT
=
∑
T∈B\{B}
(βA · γT + βT ) · χT .
As B is min-balanced on M , the uniqueness of the coefficients in (9) implies
a contradictory conclusion that simultaneously λB > 0 by (9) and λB = 0.
Thus, D ⊆ {A}∪ (B \ {B}) satisfies both (i) and (ii), so, it is min-balanced on
M by Lemma 2.1.
In order to prove the last claim, apply (10) to express the inequality
m(M)−
∑
S∈B λS ·m(S) ≥ 0 for m ∈ R
P(N)\{∅} and non-empty components
only as the sum of inequalities
βA ·m(A)−
∑
S∈BA
βA · µS ·m(S) = βA · [m(A)−
∑
S∈C
µS ·m(S)] ≥ 0,
m(M)− βA ·m(A) −
∑
S∈B\{B}
βS ·m(S) = m(M)−
∑
T∈D
βT ·m(T ) ≥ 0.
As explained in Section 3.3, the standard inequalities for the min-balanced
systems are positive multiples of these, which implies the result in RP(N)\{∅}.
The coefficients with the empty set are immaterial since they are determined
by the o-standardization condition. ⊓⊔
Let us give a simple example of a reducible system, which illustrates
Lemma 4.1.
Example 4.1 Put N = {a, b, c, d}. Let B = { {a}, {b}, {c} } be a set system on
a strict subset M = {a, b, c} of N . The corresponding inequality (8) is
m({a, b, c})−m({a})−m({b})−m({c}) + 2 ·m(∅) ≥ 0 .
Take A = {a, b} and observe that χ{a,b} = χ{a} + χ{b}, which gives χA ∈
cone {χS : S ∈ BA} with BA = { {a}, {b} }. We also have χ{a,b,c} = χ{a,b} +
χ{c} which implies that
χM ∈ cone {χT : T ∈ {A} ∪ (B \ BA)} ⊆ cone {χT : T ∈ {A} ∪ (B \ {B})}
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for both B ∈ BA = { {a}, {b} }. One has C = BA and, for both B = {a} and
B = {b}, the respective D is {A} ∪ (B \ BA) = { {a, b}, {c} }. The inequalities
(8) for C and D are
m({a, b})−m({a})−m({b}) +m(∅) ≥ 0 ,
m({a, b, c})−m({a, b})−m({c}) +m(∅) ≥ 0 .
Their sum is the above inequality (8) corresponding to B.
A more complicated example of a reducible min-balanced system is as
follows.
Example 4.2 Put N = {a, b, c, d, e} and consider a set system
B = { {a, b}, {c, e}, {d, e}, {a, c, d}, {b, c, d} }.
It is easy to show that B is min-balanced on N using Lemma 2.1. To show
that B is reducible according to Definition 4.1 we take A := {a, b, c, d} and
observe that
BA = { {a, b}, {a, c, d}, {b, c, d} }.
It follows that χA is in the conic hull of {χS : S ∈ BA} because of
χA =
1
2
· (χ{a,b} + χ{a,c,d} + χ{b,c,d}).
Consider, for example, B := {a, c, d} ∈ BA. Also χ⋃B = χN is in the conic
hull of {χT : T ∈ {A} ∪ (B \ {B})} since
χN =
1
2
· (χ{a,b,c,d} + χ{a,b} + χ{c,e} + χ{d,e}).
Hence, B is reducible.
The next example shows that some sets in an irreducible system can be
inclusion comparable.
Example 4.3 Put N = {a, b, c, d, e} and consider a set system
B = { {a, b}, {a, c, d}, {a, c, e}, {a, b, d, e}, {b, c, d, e} } .
Then one has
χN =
1
4
· (χ{a,b} + χ{a,c,d} + χ{a,c,e} + χ{a,b,d,e}) +
1
2
· χ{b,c,d,e} ,
which allows one to show, using Lemma 2.1, that B is min-balanced on N .
Owing to (the first claim in) Lemma 4.1 it is enough to test sets A ⊂
⋃
B =
N with |A| ≥ 2 and A 6∈ B whether A =
⋃
BA with BA = {S ∈ B : B ⊂ A}
and the conditions from Definition 4.1 hold. First observe that there is no set
A ⊂ N with 2 ≤ |A| ≤ 3 satisfying A =
⋃
BA. Second, consider A ⊂ N with
|A| = 4 and A 6∈ B and distinguish three cases:
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1. If A = {a, b, c, d} then BA = { {a, b}, {a, c, d} } and one has A =
⋃
BA;
however, the vector χA is not in the conic hull of {χS : S ∈ BA}.
2. If A = {a, b, c, e} then BA = { {a, b}, {a, c, e} } and the arguments are same
as in the previous case.
3. If A = {a, c, d, e} then BA = { {a, c, d}, {a, c, e} } and, again, χA is not in
the conic hull of {χS : S ∈ BA}.
In any case, the first condition in Definition 4.1 not valid for any such set A,
which implies that the min-balanced system B is irreducible.
The following result is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.1.
Corollary 4.1 Given a reducible min-balanced system B, the corresponding
inequality is a conic combination of inequalities which correspond to other
min-balanced systems B′ with
⋃
B′ ⊆
⋃
B. In particular, it is a combination of
inequalities which correspond to irreducible min-balanced systems on subsets
of
⋃
B.
5 Main result
The main result of this paper, proved in Section 5.4, is as follows.
Theorem 5.1 Let |N | ≥ 2. The facet-defining inequalities for T (N) are ex-
actly those which correspond to non-trivial irreducible min-balanced systems B
with
⋃
B ⊆ N .
Note that T (N) is not closed under reflection (Example 3.1); thus, one
cannot expect that the conjugate inequality to a facet-defining inequality for
T (N) is also facet-defining.
5.1 Characterization of the balanced and exact cones
We are going to show that the sets B(N) and E(N) are rational polyhedral
cones, by simplifying the arguments from [6, Section 3]. The following notation
will be instrumental.
Definition 5.1 Assume |N | ≥ 2. For any non-empty set D ⊆ N , we put
ΘND := { θ ∈ R
P(N) : θ(S) ≤ 0 for any S ⊆ N , S 6∈ {∅, D,N},∑
T⊆N
θ(T ) = 0 and
∑
T⊆N : i∈T
θ(T ) = 0 for any i ∈ N }.
In words, ΘND is the set of o-standardized vectors which are non-positive
outside {∅, D,N}.
Lemma 5.1 If |N | ≥ 2 and ∅ 6= D ⊆ N , then ΘNN ⊆ Θ
N
D and θ(N), θ(∅) ≥ 0,
for any θ ∈ ΘND . The only θ ∈ Θ
N
D satisfying θ(N) + θ(∅) ≥ 0 with equality is
the zero game θ = 0. In particular, ΘND is a pointed polyhedral cone containing
ΘNN and every non-zero θ ∈ Θ
N
N satisfies both θ(N) > 0 and θ(∅) > 0.
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Proof The inclusion ΘNN ⊆ Θ
N
D is evident. Thus, assume without loss of gen-
erality that D ⊂ N . Then θ(N) ≥ 0 is a valid inequality for θ ∈ ΘND . Indeed,
take i ∈ N \D and realize that θ(N) = −
∑
T⊂N : i∈T θ(T ) ≥ 0. Analogously,
for any j ∈ N ,∑
S⊆N\{j}
θ(S) =
∑
S⊆N
θ(S)−
∑
T⊆N : j∈T
θ(T ) = 0− 0 = 0 ,
which implies that θ(∅) ≥ 0 is a valid inequality for θ ∈ ΘND ; it suffices to take
j ∈ D and write θ(∅) = −
∑
∅6=S⊆N\{j} θ(S) ≥ 0. Thus, θ(N) + θ(∅) ≥ 0 is a
valid inequality for θ ∈ ΘND .
To show that the only θ ∈ ΘND satisfying θ(N) + θ(∅) = 0 is θ = 0,
realize that both θ(N) = 0 and θ(∅) = 0. The identity θ(N) = 0 implies by
0 = θ(N) = −
∑
T⊂N : i∈T θ(T ) ≥ 0, for i ∈ N \ D, that θ(T ) vanishes for
any T ⊆ N intersecting N \D. Analogously, the identity θ(∅) = 0 implies by
0 = θ(∅) = −
∑
∅6=S⊆N\{j} θ(S) ≥ 0, for j ∈ D, that θ(S) vanishes for any
S ⊂ D. Hence, 0 =
∑
T⊆N θ(T ) = θ(D) and θ = 0.
The proof of the fact that the only θ ∈ ΘNN satisfying θ(N) ≥ 0 with equal-
ity is θ = 0 is analogous: for any i ∈ N we get 0 = θ(N) = −
∑
T⊂N : i∈T θ(T ) ≥
0. Hence, θ(T ) = 0 for any ∅ 6= T ⊆ N and θ(∅) = −
∑
∅6=T⊆N θ(T ) = 0. The
same with θ ∈ ΘNN satisfying θ(∅) = 0: take j ∈ N and get 0 = θ(∅) =
−
∑
∅6=S⊆N\{j} θ(S) ≥ 0, which implies that θ(S) vanishes for S ⊂ N and,
consequently, θ(N) = −
∑
S⊂N θ(S) = 0. Thus, every non-zero θ ∈ Θ
N
N satis-
fies both θ(N) > 0 and θ(∅) > 0. ⊓⊔
To characterize the sets B(N) and E(N), we are going to use the following
criterion for feasibility of a system of linear constraints involving both inequal-
ities and equalities. In the statement, CI denotes the submatrix of a matrix
C specified by a set of rows I, bI is the subvector of a vector b determined
by its components in I, 0I is the zero vector in R
I , and C⊤/b⊤ denotes the
transpose of a matrix C/vector b. Inequalities and equalities for vectors are
understood coordinatewise.
Lemma 5.2 Let C ∈ RL×N be a real matrix and b ∈ RL a real column vector,
where L = I ∪ E with disjoint sets I and E. Then the condition
∃x ∈ RN such that both CIx ≤ bI and CEx = bE
is equivalent to the condition
∀λ ∈ RL [λI ≥ 0I and C⊤λ = 0N ] implies b⊤λ ≥ 0 .
The reader can find this feasibility criterion in [4, Theorem 9.2] in slightly
modified formulation, namely as the equivalence of negations of the conditions
from Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.3 Assume |N | ≥ 2. For any set function m ∈ RP(N), we have
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1. m ∈ B(N) iff ∀ θ ∈ ΘNN 〈θ,m〉 ≥ 0 ,
2. m ∈ E(N) iff ∀ ∅ 6= D ⊆ N ∀ θ ∈ ΘND 〈θ,m〉 ≥ 0 .
Because each of the cones ΘND is a rational polyhedral cone by definition,
the cones ΘNN and cone (
⋃
∅6=D⊆N Θ
N
D ) are generated by finitely many rational
vectors. This, together with Lemma 5.3, implies that both B(N) and E(N)
are rational polyhedral cones.
Proof One can assume without loss of generality that m ∈ G(N). Indeed,
otherwise m can be replaced by its shifted version m˜ ∈ G(N) given by (1).
Since m = m˜ + m(∅) · υ↑∅ and any θ ∈ ΘND , where ∅ 6= D ⊆ N , satisfies∑
T⊆N θ(T ) = 0, it follows that
〈θ,m〉 = 〈θ, m˜〉+m(∅) · 〈θ, υ↑∅〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 〈θ, m˜〉 =
∑
∅6=S⊆N
θ(S) · m˜(S).
Realize that both equivalences m ∈ B(N) ⇔ m˜ ∈ B(N) and m ∈ E(N) ⇔
m˜ ∈ E(N) hold.
Given a non-empty D ⊆ N and a game m ∈ G(N), the existence of an
element of the core C(m) achieving the bound for D can be characterized in
terms of ΘND :
[ ∃x ∈ C(m)
∑
i∈D
xi = m(D) ] ⇔ [ ∀ θ ∈ Θ
N
D
∑
∅6=S⊆N
θ(S) ·m(S)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
〈θ,m〉
≥ 0 ] .
(11)
The choice D = N in (11) proves the first equivalence in Lemma 5.3; the
second one follows analogously by applying (11) with all ∅ 6= D ⊆ N .
To verify (11) we formulate the condition on its left-hand side of (11) as
the feasibility condition for a system of linear constrains from Lemma 5.2.
Let L be P(N) \ {∅}, with E consisting of D and N , and I being the rest of
P(N) \ {∅}; that is, |E| = 2 if D 6= N and |E| = 1 if D = N . The matrix C
will have the entries −χS(i) for S ∈ P(N) \ {∅} and i ∈ N ; the component
of the vector b for S ∈ P(N) \ {∅} will be −m(S). Thus, by Lemma 5.2, the
condition is equivalent to the requirement that, for each λ ∈ RP(N)\{∅} such
that
1. λ(S) ≥ 0 for each S ⊆ N with the exception of sets ∅, D,N , [⇔ λI ≥ 0I ]
2. −
∑
T⊆N : i∈T
λ(T ) =
∑
∅6=T⊆N
−χT (i)·λ(T ) = 0 for any i ∈ N , [⇔ C
⊤λ = 0N ]
we get
∑
∅6=T⊆N
−m(T ) · λ(T ) ≥ 0 [⇔ b⊤λ ≥ 0].
We put θ(S) = −λ(S) for ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and θ(∅) =
∑
∅6=T⊆N λ(T ) and
observe that the itemized conditions in terms of θ mean that θ ∈ ΘND and the
conclusion that 〈θ,m〉 ≥ 0. Thus, the requirement is nothing but the condition
on the right-hand side of (11). ⊓⊔
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5.2 Extreme rays of the dual cone to the balanced cone
The following observation will be used later as an auxiliary fact.
Lemma 5.4 If |N | ≥ 2 then θ ∈ RP(N) generates an extreme ray of ΘNN iff it
is a positive multiple of the coefficient vector αB for a non-trivial min-balanced
system B on N .
We would be able to give a direct proof of Lemma 5.4, analogous to our
later proof of Lemma 5.6. Nonetheless, we guess that the reader will prefer a
shorter indirect proof based on a well-known classic result reported earlier in
Lemma 3.5.
Proof The first claim in Lemma 5.3 says that B(N) is the dual cone to ΘNN .
Since ΘNN is a polyhedral cone, this implies thatB(N) and Θ
N
N are (polyhedral)
cones which are dual each other (see Section 2). Therefore, the extreme rays
of the pointed cone ΘNN (see Lemma 5.1) correspond to facets of B(N). These
are described by non-trivial min-balanced systems on N in Lemma 3.5. In
particular, θ is an extreme ray of ΘNN iff it has the form θ = k · αB for some
k > 0 and a non-trivial min-balanced system B on N . ⊓⊔
Of course, the observation from the above proof that the cones ΘNN and
B(N) are dual each other allows one to derive Lemma 3.5 as a consequence
of the statement in Lemma 5.4. Note that, in the original proof of Lemma 3.5
from [16], the dual cone to B(N) has been described in more complicated
way, as the conic hull of an infinite set of coefficient vectors for balancing set
systems. Our simplification allows one to observe the following.
Corollary 5.1 If |N | ≥ 2 then the cone B(N) is the conic hull of its linearity
space L(N) of modular set functions and the functions −δS for ∅ 6= S ⊂ N .
Note that L(N) is spanned by the functions ±υ↑∅ and ±υ↑{i} for i ∈ N .
In particular, the extreme rays of the pointed cone Bℓ(N) := {m ∈ B(N) :
m({i}) = 0 for i ∈ N} are those generated by functions −δS for S ⊆ N ,
|S| ≥ 2.
Proof Definition 5.1 allows one to observe that the linear hull ofΘNN is the set of
o-standardized functions and that (all) facets of ΘNN are defined by inequalities
〈θ,−δS〉 ≥ 0 for ∅ 6= S ⊂ N . Thus, the dual cone B(N) has the orthogonal
complement of the linear hull of ΘNN as its linearity space and the atomic faces
of B(N) correspond to facets of ΘNN . These atomic faces correspond to the
extreme rays of any pointed version of B(N). ⊓⊔
5.3 Characterization of the totally balanced cone
First we introduce a polytope generating the dual cone to T (N).
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Definition 5.2 For any set M ⊆ N , |M | ≥ 2, we denote by ∆M the set of
θ ∈ RP(N) satisfying the conditions
1. θ(S) ≤ 0, for ∅ 6= S ⊂M , θ(R) = 0 for R ⊆ N , R \M 6= ∅ and
2. θ(∅) = 1,
∑
S⊆N θ(S) = 0,
∑
T⊆N : i∈T θ(T ) = 0 for any i ∈ N .
Further, we introduce the polytope
∆ := conv
 ⋃
M⊆N,|M|≥2
∆M
 .
Note that every ∆M is a bounded polyhedron as
1 = θ(∅) =
∑
∅6=T⊆M\{i}
−θ(T ) ≥ 0
for any i ∈M and θ(M) =
∑
S⊂M −θ(S). This makes the definition correct.
Lemma 5.5 If |N | ≥ 2 and m ∈ RP(N) then
m ∈ T (N) ⇔ 〈θ,m〉 ≥ 0 for any θ ∈ ∆.
Proof Ifm ∈ T (N) and θ ∈ ∆M for someM ⊆ N , |M | ≥ 2, then the restriction
of m to P(M) belongs to B(M), the restriction of θ to P(M) belongs to ΘMM
and 〈θ,m〉 =
∑
S⊆M θ(S) · m(S) ≥ 0 by Lemma 5.3 applied to N = M . A
convex combination of valid inequalities for T (N) is a valid inequality for T (N)
which gives 〈θ,m〉 ≥ 0 for θ ∈ ∆.
Conversely, if all the inequalities hold for m ∈ RP(N) then, for any fixed
M ⊆ N , |M | ≥ 2, the restriction ofm to P(M) satisfies
∑
S⊆M θ
′(S)·m(S) ≥ 0
for any θ′ ∈ ΘMM with θ
′(∅) = 1. By Lemma 5.1, any non-zero θ ∈ ΘMM satisfies
θ(∅) > 0 and is a positive multiple of such θ′. This implies the same inequalities
for any θ ∈ ΘMM . Hence, by Lemma 5.3 applied to N = M , the restriction of
m to P(M) belongs to B(M). The same is the case with M ⊆ N , |M | = 1,
which gives m ∈ T (N). ⊓⊔
5.4 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Lemma 5.6 A vector θ ∈ RP(N) is an extreme point of ∆ iff it is αB(∅)−1-
multiple of αB for a non-trivial irreducible min-balanced system B on some
M ⊆ N , |M | ≥ 2.
Proof Let α˜B denote the αB(∅)
−1-multiple of αB for any such system B. Every
such vector α˜B for a min-balanced system B on M ⊆ N , |M | ≥ 2, belongs to
∆M (see the formula (6) in Section 3.3) and, therefore, it belongs to ∆.
We first show that any extreme point θ of ∆ has the form α˜B for an
irreducible min-balanced system B on some M ⊆ N , |M | ≥ 2. Because of
the definition of ∆ there exists such M that θ is an extreme point of ∆M . In
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particular, the restriction of θ to P(M) generates an extreme ray of ΘMM . By
Lemma 5.4 applied to N =M we derive that θ = α˜B for some non-trivial min-
balanced system on M . Corollary 4.1 then implies that B must be irreducible
as otherwise θ is a convex combination of α˜C ∈ ∆ for irreducible min-balanced
systems C ⊆ P(M).
The second step is to show that every α˜B for a non-trivial irreducible min-
balanced system B on some M ⊆ N , |M | ≥ 2, is an extreme point of ∆. As
α˜B ∈ ∆, by the former step, one can write
α˜B =
t∑
i=1
γi · θi where t ≥ 1, γi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , t,
∑t
i=1 γi = 1, and
∀ i = 1, . . . , t, θi = α˜Bi for non-trivial min-balanced Bi on Mi ⊆ N , |Mi| ≥ 2.
We are going to show that θi = α˜B for all i = 1, . . . , t, which gives the extremity
of α˜B. Realize that, for every R ⊆ N , one has υ↑R ∈ T (N): if ∅ 6= R ⊆ S for
some ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , then the restriction of υ↑R to P(S) is in B(S) ⊆ B(S)
because 1|R| · χR ∈ R
S is in its core. Therefore, by Lemma 5.5, 〈θi, υ↑R〉 ≥ 0
for any i and R. For any R ⊆ N with R \M 6= ∅,
0 =
∑
S⊆N :R⊆S
α˜B(S) = 〈α˜B, υ
↑R〉 =
t∑
i=1
γi · 〈θi, υ
↑R〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
⇒ ∀ i 〈θi, υ
↑R〉 = 0 .
Hence, we observe by decreasing induction governed by cardinality of R that,
for any R ⊆ N with R \M 6= ∅ and i = 1, . . . , t, one has θi(R) = 0. Thus, for
every i one has Bi ⊆ P(M).
A crucial observation is that, in fact, Bi ⊆ B for any i = 1, . . . , t. To verify
that assume for contradiction that there exists j such that Bj \B 6= ∅. Consider
inclusion minimal set A ⊆ N such that [ ∃ j ∈ {1, . . . , t} A ∈ Bj \ B ]. By
Bi ⊆ P(M) for all i one has A ⊆M . The fact A ∈ Bj implies, by Lemma 2.2,
that ∅ 6= A ⊂
⋃
Bj = Mj ⊆ M , which gives A ⊂ M . Because ∅ 6= A 6∈ B
one has 0
(6)
= α˜B(A) =
∑t
i=1 γi · θi(A) (see Section 3.3) and, since j exists
with A ∈ Bj one has θj(A) = α˜Bj (A) < 0 ⇒ γj · θj(A) < 0 implying
the existence of k ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that α˜Bk(A) = θk(A) > 0, which means
A = Mk =
⋃
Bk (see Section 3.3). The inclusion minimality of A means, for
any Z ⊂ A and i, that Z ∈ Bi ⇒ Z ∈ B. In particular, any Z ∈ Bk satisfies
both Z ⊂ A and Z ∈ B and we have shown Bk ⊆ BA = {S ∈ B : S ⊂ A}.
Since Bk is min-balanced on Mk = A it implies that χA is in the conic hull of
{χS : S ∈ BA}.
Now, for every ε ≥ 0 we put
θε := α˜B + ε · (α˜B − θk)
and observe that, for sufficiently small ε > 0, one has θε ∈ ∆M (use Defini-
tion 5.2 and realize that B is on M and Bk ⊆ BA ⊆ B). On the other hand,
θε 6∈ ∆M for sufficiently large ε > 0 (because ∆M is bounded). Take maximal
ε > 0 such that θε ∈ ∆M , which means that there exists B ⊂ A such that
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θε(B) = 0 (such B necessarily belongs to Bk ⊆ B). The definition of ∆M
allows one to observe that C := {S ⊆ M : θε(S) < 0} is such that χM is in
the conic hull of {χT : T ∈ C }. Indeed, realize that θε(M) > 0 (because of⋃
Bk = A ⊂M) and that θε vanishes outside P(M) (because θε ∈ ∆M ). The
o-standardization condition from Definition 5.2 implies, for every i ∈M ,
θε(M) = −
∑
T⊆M : i∈T
θε(T ) = −
∑
T⊆M
θε(T ) · χT (i)
This gives
χM (i) = 1 =
∑
T⊆M
−θε(T )
θε(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
·χT (i) ,
which implies the claim about C. Since C ⊆ {A} ∪ (B \ {B}) one has χM is
in the conic hull of {χT : T ∈ {A} ∪ (B \ {B}) }. This altogether means, by
Definition 4.1, that B is reducible, which contradicts the assumption about B.
Thus, we are sure that Bi ⊆ B for all i = 1, . . . , t. If Bi is such that
Mi =
⋃
Bi = M then the assumption that B is min-balanced on M implies
Bi = B and αBi = αB. Hence, θi = α˜Bi = α˜B whenever Mi = M . It remains
to show that there is no j ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that Mj :=
⋃
Bj ⊂ M . Assume
for a contradiction that such j exists and write
α˜B =
t∑
i=1
γi · θi =
∑
i:Mi=M
γi · θi +
∑
j:Mj⊂M
γj · θj
=
∑
i:Mi=M
γi · α˜B +
∑
j:Mj⊂M
γj · θj .
This implies
(1−
∑
i:Mi=M
γi) · α˜B(M) =
∑
j:Mj⊂M
γj · θj(M) =
∑
j:Mj⊂M
γj · α˜Bj (M) = 0,
which gives a contradiction because both 1−
∑
i:Mi=M
γi > 0 and α˜B(M) > 0.
Thus, one necessarily has θi = α˜B for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and the extremity of
α˜B is confirmed. ⊓⊔
The following is a consequence of Lemma 5.5.
Corollary 5.2 If |N | ≥ 2 and m ∈ RP(N) then m ∈ T (N) iff
1. 〈αB,m〉 ≥ 0 for any non-trivial irreducible min-balanced system B onM ⊆
N , where |M | ≥ 2;
which is equivalent to a formally stronger condition
2. 〈αB,m〉 ≥ 0 for any non-trivial min-balanced system B on M ⊆ N , where
|M | ≥ 2.
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Proof The first statement follows directly from Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.6.
The second condition is equivalent to the first one by Corollary 4.1. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5.1 is now easy to prove.
Proof By Lemma 5.5, the cone T (N) is dual to the cone ∆˜ spanned by ∆. The
fact that ∆˜ is a closed convex cone then implies that ∆˜ and T (N) are each
others dual cones (see Section 2). Hence, the extreme points of ∆, character-
ized in Lemma 5.6, correspond to facets of T (N). The coefficient vectors for
inequalities are just the extreme points of ∆, which are positive multiples of
αB for non-trivial irreducible min-balanced systems B ⊆ P(N). ⊓⊔
6 Conjecture concerning the exact cone
One of our research goals was to characterize facet-defining inequalities for the
cone E(N). Despite we have not succeeded to get an ultimate answer to that
question we came to a sensible conjecture about what are these inequalities.
Because a crucial notion in our conjecture is the concept of an irreducible
min-balanced system introduced in Section 4, we will formulate the conjecture
in this paper.
Table 1 Numbers of facets of E(N) and of its types for n = |N | ≤ 5.
Number of players n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
Number of facets 1 6 44 280
Number of its permutational types 1 2 6 16
The first step towards the conjecture was computing all the facet-defining
inequalities for E(N) in case |N | ≤ 5; their numbers are shown in Table 1. If
|N | = 2, we have E(N) = B(N). If |N | = 3, then E(N) coincides with the
cone of supermodular functions. The results in case that |N | = 4 are given in
Example 6.1 below.
Example 6.1 We list all six permutational types of 44 facet-defining inequali-
ties for E(N) in case |N | = 4. We present a type representative, a number of
inequalities of this type, the induced set system (see Section 3.3), and indicate
what is the conjugate inequality (see Definition 3.2).
1. m(ab)−m(a)−m(b) +m(∅) ≥ 0 6×
Bα = {a, b} conjugate type 4.
2. m(abc)−m(a)−m(bc) +m(∅) ≥ 0 12×
Bα = {a, bc} conjugate type 5.
3. 2 ·m(abc)−m(ab)−m(ac)−m(bc) +m(∅) ≥ 0 4×
Bα = {ab, ac, bc} conjugate type 6.
4. m(abcd)−m(acd)−m(bcd) +m(cd) ≥ 0 6×
Bα = {acd, bcd} conjugate type 1.
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5. m(abcd)−m(ad)−m(bcd) +m(d) ≥ 0 12×
Bα = {ad, bcd} conjugate type 2.
6. m(abcd)−m(ad)−m(bd)−m(cd) + 2 ·m(d) ≥ 0 4×
Bα = {ad, bd, cd} conjugate type 3.
In case |N | = 5 we have processed the results of computation performed by
Quaeghebeur [14] in context of imprecise probabilities. The point is that the
concept of a coherent lower probability, used in that context, corresponds to
the notion of a normalized exact game. The reader is referred to [10] for more
details about the correspondence between some game-theoretical concepts and
those appearing in the context of imprecise probabilities.
The next step was to classify the inequalities into their permutational types.
Finally, we have analyzed the results from a theoretical point of view and
formulated the following conjecture, which is known to be true in case |N | ≤ 5.
Conjecture 6.1 If |N | ≥ 3 then the facet-defining inequalities for the cone
E(N) are just the inequalities corresponding to non-trivial irreducible min-
balanced systems B with
⋃
B ⊂ N and their conjugate inequalities.
The conjecture agrees with the fact that E(N) is closed under reflection
(see Lemma 3.4). As a consequence of our main result we obtain the following
simpler version of the conjecture, which is formally weaker.
Corollary 6.1 The validity of Conjecture 6.1 implies
E(N) = T (N) ∩ T ∗(N) where T ∗(N) := {m ∈ RP(N) : m∗ ∈ T (N) }.
Thus, in words, the weaker version of the conjecture is as follows (see Re-
mark 3.1):
A game m ∈ G(N) is exact iff both m and its anti-dual −m⋆ are totally
balanced.
Proof The inclusion E(N) ⊆ T (N) and the fact that E(N) is closed un-
der reflection (see Lemma 3.3) imply E(N) ⊆ T ∗(N). Hence, the inclusion
E(N) ⊆ T (N) ∩ T ∗(N) surely holds. To show the converse inclusion consider
m ∈ T (N) ∩ T ∗(N) and, by Theorem 5.1 and the formula (5), observe that
inequalities 〈αB,m〉 ≥ 0 and 〈α∗B,m〉
(5)
= 〈αB,m∗〉 ≥ 0 are valid for every
non-trivial irreducible min-balanced system B with
⋃
B ⊂ N . This implies, by
validity of Conjecture 6.1, that m ∈ E(N). Thus, T (N)∩ T ∗(N) ⊆ E(N). ⊓⊔
In fact, we are able to prove the converse of the statement from Corol-
lary 6.1, namely that E(N) = T (N) ∩ T ∗(N) implies the validity of the con-
jecture. Nonetheless, because a detailed proof of that statement would require
10 additional pages of technicalities while such a result is only marginally
relevant to the main topic of this paper, we decided to omit that proof herein.
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7 Conclusions
The prime focus of this paper is on the polyhedral cone of totally balanced
games. We have introduced a highly relevant concept of an irreducible min-
balanced set system (Definition 4.1). Our main result, Theorem 5.1, says that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between facet-defining inequalities for
the cone of totally balanced games and non-trivial irreducible min-balanced
systems on subsets of the player set. We have only paid attention to the outer
(= facial) description of the cone, whereas the problem of its inner description
(= characterizing it as the conic hull of finitely many vectors) seems to be
relevant as well; this remains to be an open task.
Some of our minor results concern the cone of balanced games. The ex-
tended version of this cone is closed under reflection transformation, which
implies that every facet-defining inequality for it is accompanied with a con-
jugate facet-defining inequality (Lemma 3.4). We have re-visited a procedure
that associates a facet-defining inequality with a min-balanced set system and
extended a well-known classic result by Shapley [16] saying that the facet-
defining inequalities for the cone of balanced games correspond to non-trivial
min-balanced systems on the whole player set N ; see Section 3.3. What we
have shown is that a complementary set system to a min-balanced set system
on N is also a min-balanced system on N and gives a conjugate inequality
(Corollary 3.1). Further side-result is the inner description of the cone of bal-
anced games (Corollary 5.1).
Our tools made it also possible to contribute to the study of the cone of
exact games. The extended version of this cone is also closed under reflection
transformation, which implies that facet-defining inequalities for it come in
pairs of mutually conjugate inequalities (Lemma 3.4). In this paper we have
formulated a conjecture about what are facet-defining inequalities for this cone,
which complies with the above observation (see Conjecture 6.1). Our hypoth-
esis is supported by computations for a small number of players; thus, we will
concentrate on proving/disproving this conjecture in our future research. Note
in this context that the extremity of an exact game can be recognized by a
relatively simple linear-algebraic test; see [21, Proposition 4] for the details.
A Min-balanced systems for a small number of players
Here we give a list of all permutational types of non-trivial min-balanced systems for at
most four players. We present a type representative, indicate what is the type of the com-
plementary system (Definition 3.4) and whether the type is irreducible, give the standard
inequality ascribed to the system (see Section 3.3) and say what is the number of systems
of this type. In order to shorten the notation we write abc instead of {a, b, c}.
A.1 Two players
The only non-trivial min-balanced system on N = {a, b} is as follows.
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1. B = {a, b} self-complementary, irreducible
m(ab) −m(a) −m(b) +m(∅) ≥ 0 1×
A.2 Three players
The following are all three types of 5 non-trivial min-balanced systems on N = {a, b, c}.
1. B = {a, b, c} complementary type 3.
m(abc) −m(a) −m(b) −m(c) + 2 ·m(∅) ≥ 0 1×
2. B = {a, bc} self-complementary, irreducible
m(abc) −m(a) −m(bc) +m(∅) ≥ 0 3×
3. B = {ab, ac, bc} complementary type 1., irreducible
2 ·m(abc) −m(ab) −m(ac) −m(bc) +m(∅) ≥ 0 1×
Thus, one has two types of 4 irreducible min-balanced systems on N = {a, b, c}.
A.3 Four players
The following are all nine types of 41 non-trivial min-balanced system on N = {a, b, c, d}.
1. B = {a, b, c, d} complementary type 9.
m(abcd) −m(a) −m(b) −m(c) −m(d) + 3 ·m(∅) ≥ 0 1×
2. B = {a, b, cd} complementary type 6.
m(abcd) −m(a) −m(b) −m(cd) + 2 ·m(∅) ≥ 0 6×
3. B = {ab, cd} self-complementary, irreducible
m(abcd) −m(ab) −m(cd) +m(∅) ≥ 0 3×
4. B = {a, bcd} self-complementary, irreducible
m(abcd) −m(a) −m(bcd) +m(∅) ≥ 0 4×
5. B = {a, bc, bd, cd} complementary type 8.
2 ·m(abcd) − 2 ·m(a) −m(bc) −m(bd) −m(cd) + 3 ·m(∅) ≥ 0 4×
6. B = {ab, acd, bcd} complementary type 2., irreducible
2 ·m(abcd) −m(ab) −m(acd) −m(bcd) +m(∅) ≥ 0 6×
7. B = {a, bd, cd, abc} self-complementary
2 ·m(abcd) −m(a) −m(bd) −m(cd) −m(abc) + 2 ·m(∅) ≥ 0 12×
8. B = {ab, ac, ad, bcd} complementary type 5., irreducible
3 ·m(abcd) −m(ab) −m(ac) −m(ad) − 2 ·m(bcd) + 2 ·m(∅) ≥ 0 4×
9. B = {abc, abd, acd, bcd} complementary type 1., irreducible
3 ·m(abcd) −m(abc) −m(abd) −m(acd) −m(bcd) +m(∅) ≥ 0 1×
Thus, there are five types of 18 irreducible min-balances systems on N = {a, b, c, d}.
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